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it provides a common analytical framework to most results presented
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11 Introduction
In the United States, but generally not in Europe, ﬁrms are criminally liable
for crimes committed by their employees within the scope of the ﬁrm and to
its beneﬁt. The nature of corporate crime comprises essentially fraud (usually
against the government), environmental violations, and antitrust violations
(Cohen, 1996).
Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economics of
enforcement. Are corporate crimes diﬀerent from other crimes? Are these
crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or
both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Should corporate liability be
criminal or civil?
This paper has two major contributions to the literature. First, it pro-
vides a common analytical framework to most results presented and largely
discussed in the ﬁeld. In second place, by making use of the framework,
we provide new insights into how corporations should be punished for the
oﬀenses committed by their employees.
Evidence suggests that wrongdoing by corporations is largely an agency
cost. It appears to be the case that the managers do not commit corporate
crimes to serve the interests of the shareholders (Alexander and Cohen, 1996
and 1999). Thus, the usual economic model of crime needed to be extended
to a principal and agent framework in order to explain corporate crime.
Even though the economic analysis of crime is now over 30 years old,
Becker’s (1968) analysis of optimal punishment has only recently been ap-
plied to corporate crime. While most of the literature surveyed in Polinsky
and Shavell (2000) has been concerned with optimal sanctioning of rational
individuals, recent theoretical analysis has focused on employee-manager re-
lationship. Given the existence of diﬀerent interests, one aims at designing
the appropriate incentives to deter oﬀenses. Under an optimal design, it is
useful to discuss if it is desirable to hold an employee liable for corporate
crimes (Polinsky and Shavell, 1993; Shavell, 1997), or what the structure of
optimal corporate sanctions should be (Arlen, 1994).
In Becker’s model, an oﬀense is committed by a rational individual who
decides whether or not to commit the crime based on the probability and
severity of punishment. However, in the context of corporations or organi-
2zations, the crime results from diﬀerent possible actors committing or pre-
venting oﬀenses. Thus, the results presented in Polinsky and Shavell (2000)
must be reinterpreted in the context of corporate crime.
Corporate crime is not committed by ﬁrms, as such, but by diﬀerent in-
dividuals within the corporation, who are eventually criminally liable. A
socially optimal criminal sanctioning policy would favor large corporate ﬁnes
over criminal liability (and jail sentences) for these individuals involved in
the criminal activity (Cohen, 1996). This claim, based on Becker’s analysis,
assumes that corporate directors and shareholders who could be subject to
large ﬁnes will provide the correct amount of employee monitoring, and even-
tually ex post sanctions on their employees to ensure that socially harmful
oﬀenses are not committed. In a perfect world, with complete contracting and
without liquidity constraints, individual liability alone would induce eﬃcient
behavior. Consequently, corporate liability would not be necessary (Arlen,
1999). Conversely, corporate liability is worthwhile investigating when con-
tracts are incomplete or when solvency matters.
Imposing non-monetary sanctions (e.g., imprisonment sentences) is a par-
tial solution to the problem of agents’ insuﬃcient wealth. Imprisonment how-
ever is expensive and usually courts are not willing to impose them (Arlen
and Kraakman, 1997). Thus, corporate liability is the other possible solution.
Corporate liability can take the form of strict liability imposed whenever a
crime takes place; duty-based liability imposed only the ﬁrm itself violates a
legal duty; or a composite regime in which the ﬁrm is liable but the magnitude
of the sanction depends on whether the ﬁrm complied with its duties (Arlen,
1999). Vicarious liability is the strict liability of a principal or the ﬁrm for
the misconduct of an agent or an employee. Most corporate liability for torts,
and in the United States for crimes as well, is vicarious (Kraakman, 1999).
Within a context of corporate liability, shareholders become quasi-enforcers.
Since corporations are held strictly liable for their employees’ actions, the
government delegates on the corporation the task of monitoring and control-
ling potential oﬀenders (Baysinger, 1991). It lowers the cost of enforcement
to the government, but it increases the monitoring costs to ﬁrms. Moreover,
the government must make sure the ﬁrm has the appropriate incentives to
monitor and penalize its employees.
The principal-agent setup is the usual framework to study this problem,
3where the government is the principal, the shareholders are the supervisors,
and the employees are the agents. Note in passing that most of the literature
characterizes the problem as the corporation being the principal and the
employees the agents. Our characterization seems more appropriate and
more useful as discussed later.
One important question is which party (the government or ﬁrm) is the
least-cost enforcer. It could be the case that imposing individual criminal li-
ability might be less expensive than imposing high monitoring costs on ﬁrms.
However, the standard case for corporate liability points out that ﬁrms have
better information, thus providing less expensive preventive measures. As
Arlen and Kraakman (1997) characterize, a ﬁrm could be ‘superior sanction-
er’ because their enforcement measures are more credible and eﬀective.
The second important point is how the ﬁrm might align the interests of
its employees with its own. In particular, the analysis depends on whether
or not the ﬁrm has the ability to provide correct incentives. Corporate and
individual sanctions are substitutes in order to deter crime as long as the
employee can bear the full cost of the optimal monetary ﬁne. If the penalty
is imposed on the ﬁrm, it will be passed along to its employees by lowering
salaries. When the ﬁrm is unable to shift the penalty to the employee, the
penalty should be placed directly on the employee and the corporation must
monitor the employee’s action to prevent the occurrence.1
Aligning the interests of the corporation with those of the government is
also expensive (Block, 1991; Alexander and Cohen, 1999). The general result
seems to be that poorly performing corporations are more likely to engage in
crime (Macey, 1991). Alexander and Cohen (1996) also ﬁnd that larger ﬁrms
are more likely to engage in crime than smaller ﬁrms. Weak internal controls
and concern with short-term ﬁnancial arrangements, and less concern with
long run portfolio diversiﬁcation, seem to be positively related to corporate
crime (Baysinger, 1991). Consequently, performance and dimension of the
ﬁrm aﬀect the government’s cost in monitoring the corporation.
Inducing optimal monitoring and ensuring internal sanctioning (that is,
credibility of ﬁrm’s enforcement policy) is not immune to controversy. Arlen
(1994) identiﬁes a ‘potentially perverse eﬀect’ by which holding ﬁrms (vicari-
1Cohen (1996) ﬁnds that sanctions increase with harm and increased individual liability
when the organization cannot aﬀord to pass along to its employees the ﬁne.
4ously) liable for oﬀenses committed by its employees can increase enforcement
costs. If the information that the ﬁrm acquires can be used to increase its own
probability of incurring liability, the ﬁrm will not monitor optimally. In order
to tackle this eﬀect, a composite liability regime where some duty-based lia-
bility or mitigation provisions are included has been proposed (Arlen, 1994;
Arlen and Kraakman, 1997).2 However, it has been noted when information
costs are high, strict liability could be preferable.3
The role of risk aversion is not explicitly considered in our paper. Port-
folio diversiﬁcation means shareholders behave as if they were risk neutral,
whereas managers are risk averse. Criminal liability increases the risk of
projects, making managers less willing to take them. However, because share-
holders are risk neutral, they should be more willing to accept projects that
involve criminal oﬀenses, ceteris paribus. These observations suggest that
managers should be pushed by shareholders to take projects that involve
criminal oﬀenses. Corporation criminal liability would be justiﬁed as a de-
vice to deter this type of behavior by shareholders (Macey, 1991). Clearly
there is an inconsistency with empirical evidence (Romano, 1991): Managers
do not commit corporate crimes to serve the interests of the shareholders
Our paper is organized the following way: the basic model is presented
in section two, while sections three (moral hazard), four (reputation loss),
ﬁve (internal punishment), and six (internal control) consider diﬀerent ex-
tensions. Final remarks are addressed in section seven.
2 Basic Model
The underlying results of the literature come from the principal-agent model
in which the ﬁrm’s choice of compensation contract aﬀects the agent’s choice
of care in avoiding crime. In that respect, our model draws on Alexander
and Cohen (1999) and Gans (2000).
2Duty-based liability is imposed only when the ﬁrm itself violates a legal duty, and not
whenever a crime occurs as in strict liability.
3An important extension of corporate criminal law is the potential use of secondary
liability beyond the ﬁrm. In particular, liability of ‘gatekeepers’ as a third party monitor-
ing the corporation could be useful. Examples include criminal liability of auditors and
lawyers.
5Suppose that equity depends on two sort of activities, one being the usual
productive eﬀort (m) and the other a socially harmful behavior, e.g. violation
of some environmental regulations (n). The expected value of management’s
equity is given by G(m;n), where  is the fraction of outstanding equities
securities that management owns and G(:) is the expected value of ﬁrm
equity.
Equity is determined the following way: it is one with probability m + n
and zero with probability 1  m  n. Thus, the expected value of equity is
G(m;n) = m + n.
The expected private value of management’s socially harmful behavior is
E(n), where En > 0 and Enn < 0. Management’s eﬀort cost is C(n;m),
where Cn > 0, Cm > 0, Cnn > 0, Cmm > 0, and Cmn > 0.
While n denotes the management’s inﬂuence over the probability that
corporate crime will occur, let u be an independent random inﬂuence variable
with distribution function F(:). Assuming n and u have additive eﬀects,
social damage occurs if and only if n + u > 0. Thus, the probability of
social damage being observed is Pr(n + u > 0) = 1  F(n) = P(n), the
probability of crime being continuously increasing in n, Pn > 0 and Pnn  0.
It is assumed that the government cannot actually observe n. However,
if the social bad occurs, the government can, with probability , detect the
agent’s harmful activity and punish accordingly. Management bears, in that
event, a penalty sa while the employer bears a penalty sp.
The ﬁxed component of the salary of the management is !. The expected
proﬁts of the (risk neutral) management are:
U = ! + (m + n) + E(n)  C(n;m)  P(n)sa (1)
The expected proﬁts of the owners of the ﬁrm are:
V = (1  )(m + n)  !  P(n)sp (2)
The optimal contract when the employer can observe m and n is described
by maximizing the expected proﬁts of the owners of the ﬁrm subject to the
participation constraint, U  k, where k is the agent’s reservation utility.
Rearranging expected proﬁts, we can write:
V = m + n + E(n)  C(n;m)  P(n)(sa + sp)  k (3)
6The ﬁrst-order conditions of the problem are:
Vm = 1  Cm = 0 (4)
Vn = 1 + En  Cn  Pn(sa + sp) = 0 (5)
Since second-order conditions are satisﬁed, we derive the optimal contract
hm;ni. The socially harmful activity is decreasing in the policy parameters
h;sa;spi, whereas the productive eﬀort is increasing in those same parame-
ters (because Cmn > 0).
As in the usual framework (Polinsky and Shavell, 2000), we consider social
welfare to be the sum of the payoﬀs of the employer and of the management
minus the social damage caused by the socially harmful activity. Social
welfare is given by:
W = m + n + E(n)  C(m;n)  P(n)H  k (6)
where H is social harm. Notice that the diﬀerence between the government’s
objective and the employer’s is the social damage. By setting sa + sp =
H=, the government can make the employer’s objective identical to its own.
Nevertheless this is not a ﬁrst best outcome because enforcement is costly
(Becker, 1968).
It is not very relevant who is actually punished since management and
employer can bargain ex ante and reallocate sanctions. It is equally eﬀective
to set sa = H= and sp = 0 or sp = H= and sa = 0. Furthermore, individual
liability of management alone induces eﬃcient behavior.
Corporate liability is not needed or necessary unless there is a wealth
constraint that limits sa. Suppose there is a binding liquidity constraint so
that sa = ¯ ! < H=. Then, we should have sp = H=  ¯ ! to fully internalize
social damage. Corporate liability is justiﬁed on the grounds that managers
do not have enough wealth to pay for social damage (Polinsky and Shavell,
1993; Shavell, 1997).
In our model, the principal is the government, not the corporation. The
corporation and its management team are the agents. There is virtually no
distinction between corporation and management because their interests can
be aligned at no cost. Once the alignment of interests is costly, the manager
is the agent, but the corporation becomes a supervisor or a quasi-enforcer.
73 Model with moral hazard
Suppose the employer cannot observe what sort of activities generated any
realized proﬁt. Let us restrict our attention to linear wage contracts. The
ﬁrst-order conditions of the problem for management are:
Um =   Cm = 0 (7)
Un =  + En  Cn  Pnsa = 0 (8)
Since second-order conditions are satisﬁed, we derive the agent’s choice of
eﬀort hˆ m; ˆ ni.
The optimal contract when the employer cannot observe m and n is de-
scribed by maximizing the expected proﬁts of the owners of the ﬁrm subject
to the participation constraint, U  k, and to the incentive compatibility
constraint, hˆ m; ˆ ni. Rearranging expected proﬁts, we can write:
V = ˆ m + ˆ n + E(ˆ n)  C(ˆ n; ˆ m)  P(ˆ n)(sa + sp)  k (9)
The ﬁrst-order condition of the problem is:
V = Vm ˆ m + Vnˆ n = 0 (10)
where
Vm = 1  Cm(ˆ m) = 1  
Vn = 1 + En(ˆ n)  Cn(ˆ n)  Pn(ˆ n)(sa + sp)
= 1    Pn(ˆ n)sp (11)
Let us ignore the sanctions for a moment. It is straightforward that we can
delegate the optimal eﬀort plan by setting  = 1. That is hardly surprising
in this framework since both employer and management are risk neutral.
A similar conclusion is derived if sp = 0. In other words, when corporations
are not liable for agent’s behavior, the optimal contract can be delegated in
the presence of moral hazard.
Suppose now that sp > 0. Setting  = 1 leads to too much socially harmful
activity because management ignores the sanction borne by the employer.
8Thus, the employer chooses  < 1 to reduce liability, but at the same time,
diminishes productive eﬀort (Gans, 2000).
Corporate liability distorts incentives inside the corporation. From a policy
view, in this context, corporate liability should not be introduced. Thus,
from the set of possible policies we have considered before, we should have
sa = H= and sp = 0.
Consider again a binding liquidity constraint so that sa = ¯ ! < H=. Then,
we need sp = H=  ¯ ! to fully internalize the externality. Management’s
limited wealth generates the need of corporate liability to internalize social
damage. However, note that there is a loss of eﬃciency because of incentives
being distorted. As a consequence, the policy should be to ﬁx corporate
liability such that 0 < sp < H=  ¯ !. In general, the social damage in not
fully internalized because of the loss of eﬃciency due to the distortion of
incentives (Polinsky and Shavell, 1993).
4 Model with reputational sanctions
Suppose the employer suﬀers a loss of reputation if found liable for involve-
ment in socially harmful activities. Denote this loss of reputation by a mon-
etary measure . The agent’s choice of eﬀort hˆ m; ˆ ni is the same as before
since nothing changed for the agent.
The optimal contract is described as before by maximizing the expected
proﬁts of the owners of the ﬁrm subject to the participation constraint, U  k,
and to the incentive compatibility constraint, hˆ m; ˆ ni. Rearranging expected
proﬁts, we can write:
V = ˆ m + ˆ n + E(ˆ n)  C(ˆ n; ˆ m)  P(ˆ n)(sa + sp + )  k
Notice that the loss of reputation  plays the role of a penalty.
The ﬁrst-order condition of the problem is:
V = Vm ˆ m + Vnˆ n = 0 (12)
where
Vm = 1  Cm(ˆ m) = 1  
9Vn = 1 + En(ˆ n)  Cn(ˆ n)  Pn(ˆ n)(sa + sp + )
= 1    Pn(ˆ n)(sp + ) (13)
Within our discussion before, it is easy to see that we cannot delegate the
optimal eﬀort plan even if sp = 0 (unless of course  = 0). From a social
viewpoint, we should have sa = H= and sp =  to guarantee eﬃcient
incentives and full internalization of social harm. Not only sanctioning the
employer distorts incentives, but the government should bear the cost of rep-
utation losses (by subsidizing corporations) to make sure the optimal eﬀort
plan is chosen. Setting the employer’s sanction to zero is not enough because
the principal still bears a reputation loss. Indeed corporate liability creates
ineﬃciency because of reputation loss even if the monetary penalty paid to
the government is relatively low.
Suppose there is a binding wealth constraint on the agent. We know al-
ready that sa = ¯ !, but the government should be careful in setting the
sanction of the employer. If the loss of reputation is ignored, there will be
over-deterrence (Lott, 1996). In other words, by setting sp = H= ¯ !, there
is over-deterrence because the corporation actually suﬀers sp + . Conse-
quently, we should consider sp = H=  ¯ !   to assure full internalization
of social damage. Nevertheless, as before, there is a trade-oﬀ between full
internalization of social damage and eﬃcient incentives. Thus, we should
have  < sp < H=  ¯ !   to avoid over-deterrence and ﬁnd the optimal
response to the trade-oﬀ between full internalization of social damage and
eﬃcient incentives.
5 Model with internal punishment
Suppose the employer can apply an internal punishment in the form of a
monetary penalty if the socially harmful activity is detected by the govern-
ment. Denote such penalty by si. The ﬁrst-order conditions of the problem
for management are now:
Um =   Cm = 0 (14)
Un =  + En  Cn  Pn(sa + si) = 0 (15)
10Since second-order conditions are satisﬁed, we derive the agent’s choice of
eﬀort hˆ m; ˆ ni.
The optimal contract is described as before by maximizing the expected
proﬁts of the owners of the ﬁrm subject to the participation constraint, U  k,
and to the incentive compatibility constraint, hˆ m; ˆ ni. Rearranging expected
proﬁts, we can write again:
V = ˆ m + ˆ n + E(ˆ n)  C(ˆ n; ˆ m)  P(ˆ n)(sa + sp)  k
Note that the internal penalty si disappears from V because the ﬁxed salary
! exactly compensates for the expected internal penalty (by solving the par-
ticipation constraint).
The ﬁrst-order conditions of the problem are:
V = Vm ˆ m + Vnˆ n = 0 (16)
Vsi = Vm ˆ msi + Vnˆ nsi = 0 (17)
where
Vm = 1  Cm(ˆ m) = 1  
Vn = 1 + En(ˆ n)  Cn(ˆ n)  Pn(ˆ n)(sa + sp)
= 1    Pn(ˆ n)(sp  si) (18)
It is easy to see that we can delegate the optimal eﬀort plan by setting
 = 1 and si = sp. As long as management pays for the employer’s sanction,
the best solution can be achieved. Corporate liability becomes less important
if an internal penalty system can be designed so that management bears the
liability loss.
One problem with internal punishment is that there are legal limitations
to employer’s ability to control management. Suppose these constraints are
binding so that si = ¯ s < sp. Then, we have  < 1 for the reasons dis-
cussed before, that is, by reducing liability costs, the employer also reduces
productive eﬀort. The optimal eﬀort plan cannot be delegated.
From the government’s viewpoint, any policy where sp  ¯ s and sa =
H=  sp is equally eﬀective. Corporate liability does not play a major role
11as long as the government recognizes the internal penalty as a mechanism to
achieve eﬃcient incentives (Shavell, 1997).
Consider again the possibility of a binding wealth constraint on the agent.
It must be the case that sa + si  ¯ !. In order to assure optimal eﬀort, we
should have si = sp, which implies sa+sp  ¯ !. The problem of course is that
because ¯ ! is less than H=, the social damage is not internalized. Recall that
full internalization of the social damage implies sa + sp = H=. Given the
wealth constraint, to assure full internalization it is necessary the case that
si < sp, that is, the optimal eﬀort plan is not delegated because incentives
are distorted.
The design of enforcement policy must take into account that, in absence
of restrictions on internal punishment, the corporation will set si = ¯ !  sa.
By setting sa = ¯ !, the corporation cannot apply an internal punishment
scheme (since management cannot pay for it), and si = 0 . In this situation
incentives are highly distorted inside the ﬁrm. Thus, in general, the policy
will be described by 0 < sa < ¯ ! and 0 < sp < H=  sa as a response
to the trade-oﬀ between internalization of social damages and appropriate
incentives inside the corporation.
Notice that if sa = ¯ !, the policy is described as in the simple model with
moral hazard, making no use of internal punishment. By reducing sa, the
corporation can make use of internal punishment and improve incentives in-
side the ﬁrm. However, a reduction of sa asks for an increase of sp to oﬀset
the negative eﬀect on the internalization of social damage. Nevertheless, an
increase of sp distorts incentives inside the corporation. Thus, the govern-
ment might not want to increase sp and accept less internalization of social
damage than otherwise, but more eﬃcient incentives.
6 Model with internal control
The model so far presented is one of corporate strict liability, where the
punishment of the corporation sp is applied once the socially harmful activity
is detected by the government. In this version of the model, we extend the
analysis to internal control and consider a composite liability regime with
some duty-based liability.
12Consider that the corporation has the possibility of introducing an internal
control device: Management is audited and detected with probability  by the
employer. If detected by the employer, management will be reported to the
government. The probability of being detected by the government if detected
by the employer is one because the corporation acts as a quasi-enforcer.4 If
management is not detected by the employer, there is a probability  of
being detected by the government. The sanction imposed on the agent is sa.
The sanction imposed on the employer is sq if management is detected by
the corporation, and sp if management is detected by the government. The
diﬀerence sp  sq could be interpreted as corporate liability mitigation for
introducing internal control mechanisms. The cost for the employer to set
such internal control device is T(), where T 0 > 0 for  > 0, T 0(0) = 0, and
T 00 > 0.
The expected proﬁts of the (risk neutral) management are:
U = ! + (m + n) + E(n)  C(n;m)  P(n)[ + (1  )]sa (19)
For a given , the likelihood of management being detected is higher when
an internal control mechanism is adopted. The ﬁrst-order conditions of the
problem for management are:
Um =   Cm = 0 (20)
Un =  + En  Cn  Pn[ + (1  )]sa = 0 (21)
Since second-order conditions are satisﬁed, we derive the agent’s choice of
eﬀort hˆ m; ˆ ni.
The optimal contract is described as before by maximizing the expected
proﬁts of the owners of the ﬁrm subject to the participation constraint, U  k,
and to the incentive compatibility constraint, hˆ m; ˆ ni. Rearranging expected
proﬁts, we can write again:
V = ˆ m + ˆ n + E(ˆ n)  C(ˆ n; ˆ m)  P(ˆ n)[(sa + sq) + (1  )(sa + sp)]  T()  k
The ‘perverse eﬀect’ of adopting internal control mechanisms is exposed by
comparing the expected sanction (sa+sq) with (1)(sa+sp). Employer’s
4We discuss later the possibility that the corporation may renege on its enforcement
responsibilities.
13monitoring and detection activities generate compromising evidence that can
make conviction easier. Setting sq < sp is not enough to make sure that the
employer does really prefer an internal control device for two reasons. First,
even though the sanction is lower, the likelihood of paying it could be high
enough to oﬀset the ﬁrst eﬀect (Arlen, 1994). Second, the employers bears
the sanction paid by the agent (because of the participation constraint), and
the agent is ﬁned with a higher probability when there is internal control.
The ﬁrst-order conditions of the problem are:
V = Vm ˆ m + Vnˆ n = 0 (22)
V = Vm ˆ m + Vnˆ n
P(ˆ n)[(1  )sa + sq  sp]  T
0 = 0 (23)
where
Vm = 1  Cm(ˆ m) = 1  
Vn = 1 + En(ˆ n)  Cn(ˆ n)  Pn(ˆ n)[(sa + sq) + (1  )(sa + sp)]
= 1    Pn(ˆ n)[sq + (1  )sp] (24)
It is easy to see that we cannot delegate the optimal eﬀort as long as at
least one of sp or sq is positive (as long as there is corporate liability). From
social welfare viewpoint, by setting:
(sa + sq) + (1  )(sa + sp) = H (25)
the government can make the employer’s objective identical to its own. One
possibility is to set sp = sq = 0 and sa = H=[ + (1  )]. Given that
both the government and the employer have the same objective function, the
decision of introducing an internal control mechanism taken by the employer
is socially optimal. Clearly in this case the corporation never adopts an
internal mechanism control since there is no corporate liability.
We consider a binding wealth constraint to generate more interesting re-
sults. Suppose sa = ¯ !. Full internalization of social damage is guaranteed
by solving:
sq + (1  )sp = H  ¯ ![ + (1  )] (26)
14It is important to note that the right-hand-side of (26) is decreasing in
. With an internal control mechanism, full internalization of social damage
when management has a wealth constraint can be achieved with a lower
expected sanction for the employer. Consider a very eﬀective internal system
where management is detected with probability one. Full internalization of
social damage requires the sanction sq = H¯ ! which is less than the sanction
derived in section three, sp = H=  ¯ !, when there is no internal control.
It conﬁrms that full internalization of social damage can be achieved with a
lower sanction for the employer.
When social damage is fully internalized, the government and the corpora-
tion have the same objective function. By construction, the employer would
choose the socially optimal internal control mechanism since both employer
and government have the same objective function. But we already know
that the consequence is that incentives will be distorted inside the corpora-
tion (due to the fact that  < 1).
The distortion of incentives which has been explained in section three
implies that generally we will have:
sq + (1  )sp < H  ¯ ![ + (1  )] (27)
The implication is that the objective function of the employer is no longer
that of the government. The optimal  for the corporation is described by
(23). There are three eﬀects to be considered. The last term measures the
marginal cost of introducing an internal mechanism. The ﬁrst two terms are
positive because an internal mechanism generates more eﬃcient incentives (it
increases productive eﬀort and reduces the socially harmful activity). The
third term measures the marginal gain for the corporations from introducing
an internal control mechanism in terms of being sanctioned. The so-called
‘potentially perverse eﬀect’ is measured by the marginal gain sp sq (1
)¯ !.
Suppose sp sq (1)¯ ! < 0, that is, the third tem in (23) is positive.
In our model, this corresponds to the so-called ‘potentially perverse eﬀect’
(Arlen, 1994). Liability costs are increased for the corporation, and so the
employer will be less willing to invest on an internal control device. The
reason would be that even though an internal mechanism control improves
incentives inside the corporation, it increases liability and enforcement costs.
15Note that if incentives were eﬃcient, an employer would always reject an
internal control mechanism.
From the policymaker viewpoint, the corporation’s choice of  would be
socially optimal when the third term is zero.5 Consequently, the policymaker
should set:
sq = sp  (1  )¯ ! (28)
The liability mitigation diﬀerential is justiﬁed on the basis that it makes
the employer’s choice of an internal control mechanism socially optimal. In
general, we should expect sq < 0, that is, the corporation should be compen-
sated for introducing the (socially optimal) internal control device.
When the corporation is a ‘superior sanctioner,’ the cost T 0 will be rea-
sonably low whereas the probability  will be high enough. The government
prefers corporate liability with an internal mechanism. However, if the gov-
ernment is a ‘superior sanctioner,’ the cost T 0 will be large and the probability
 will be low. It is better to have corporate liability without relying too much
on an internal control mechanism (Arlen and Kraakman, 1997).
One possible problem with an internal mechanism is the incentive for the
corporation to renegade on its enforcement responsibilities, settle with man-
agement a private deal, and not report to the government. One possible way
to avoid the problem is having the government auditing the corporation mak-
ing sure the employer does not renege on enforcement commitments. This
governmental auditing makes an internal control mechanism more expensive,
and eventually less appealing. The alternative way is for the government to
pay a compensation for the employer. Let us show that the solution we
propose is collusion-proof.
By informing the government, the employer loses sq, whereas by not in-
forming, the employer faces a sanction sp with probability . Management
pays sa if the employer reports, whereas faces a sanction sa with probability
 if the employer does not report. The maximum payment management is
willing to make is sa(1  ). The payoﬀ of employer by reporting is sq
whereas the expected payoﬀ by withholding evidence is sa(1)sp. Tak-
ing sq as shown in (28), we have that both payoﬀs are the same, making
5From maximizing W with respect to , it is immediate that the ﬁrst-order condition
is similar to (23) when the third term is zero.
16collusion not possible. The corporation has no incentive to renege on its
enforcement responsibilities.
In conclusion, the policy would be to set sq = sp  (1  )¯ ! and 0 <
sp < H= ¯ !. The sanction sq assures that an internal control mechanism is
socially optimal. The sanction sp is determined by the optimal response to
the trade-oﬀ between fully internalizing social damage and designing eﬃcient
incentives.
7 Conclusion
Our paper has reviewed the economic model of corporate criminal law within
a uniﬁed framework. We oﬀer new insights, in particular, we extensively
discuss the role of moral hazard and liquidity constraints in creating the
need for corporate liability.
The critique of corporate criminal liability versus civil penalties proceeds
on three fronts. First, Fischel and Sykes (1996) note that incarceration is
unavailable against corporations and makes little sense in the context of
corporate liability. Even though it might appear to reduce the insolvency
problem caused by imposing very high ﬁnes, it will impose additional non-
monetary sanctions, such as stigma. Karpoﬀ and Lott (1993), Khanna (1996)
and Lott (1996) argue that corporate criminal sanctions have an associated
reputational loss absent on civil penalties. The loss of reputation could over-
penalize corporations (Alexander, 1999).
The second critique refers to the fact that corporate penalties do not aim
at conventional deterrence, but at monitoring, leading to over-deterrence
(Fischel and Sykes, 1996; Parker, 1996). When a corporation cannot dis-
tinguish between good and harmful acts, but can only set incentives based
on observed variables, the imposition of criminal liability could dilute in-
centives and reduce productivity (Gans, 2000). Nevertheless, the empirical
eﬀect on management turnover and governance changes does not seem to be
very systematic (Agrawal, Jaﬀe and Karpoﬀ, 1999).
Finally, even though corporate liability could serve a preference-shaping
function, other mechanisms could be more eﬃcient, e.g. publicity (Khanna,
1996).
17Our paper shows that corporate criminal liability is useful when agents
cannot pay for the social damage their actions cause. Nevertheless, because
of the several problems mention above, the sanction borne by the corpora-
tion is less than what should be to fully internalize social damage. The paper
points out that corporate criminal liability is the solution to a trade-oﬀ be-
tween internalization of social damage (i.e., socially optimal deterrence) and
eﬃcient incentives (due to moral hazard)
Our model suggests that corporate monetary ﬁnes should be low, a result
with strong empirical evidence (Cohen, 1991). The introduction of corporate
criminal sentencing guidelines and the Sentencing Commission’s announced
intention of raising and restructuring corporate monetary penalties seem to
indicate that until 1991 corporate ﬁnes were too limited. After 1991, it is
of dispute if corporate criminal sentencing plays an important role in the
overall public enforcement eﬀort (Alexander, Arlen and Cohen, 1999; Parker
and Atkins, 1999)
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